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MOTHERS, MYTHS, AND THE LAW OF DIVORCE: ONE 
MORE FEMINIST CASE FOR PARTNERSHIP 
CYNTHIA LEE STARNES* 
What was once thought can never be unthought. 1 
Since the early days of no-fault divorce, family law has embraced 
a vision of marriage as a companionate relationship in which spouses 
make equal or similar contributions to work and home.2 Grudgingly, 
the law has begun to concede that this egalitarian model is some-
times more aspirational than real. Traditional marriages still exist, 
and when they fail after many years, equity often demands a remedy 
not contemplated by no-fault's clean-break philosophy.3 Also incon-
sistent with an egalitarian model are the many quasi-traditional 
marriages in which two wage-earning spouses divide domestic respon-
sibilities along gender lines in ways that, over time, reduce a mother's 
earning capacity.4 
The disconnect between a normative model of egalitarian mar-
riage and real marriage was made startlingly clear in a recent study 
by Virginia sociologists Bradford Wilcox and Steven Nock. Expecting 
to find that women were happiest in marriages marked by egalitari-
anism,5 the researchers instead found that women, including those 
with egalitarian beliefs about marriage, were happiest in marriages 
marked by traditional gender roles.6 While the explanation for this 
finding is unclear, the finding itself undercuts the law's marriage 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to Jane 
Edwards, Hildur Hanna, and Barbara Bean for their excellent research support. 
1. FRIEDRICHDORRENMA'IT, THE PHYSICISTS 92 (James Kirkrup trans., Grove Press, 
Inc. 1964) (1962). 
2. In an egalitarian (companionate) marriage model, "spouses share similar work 
and family responsibilities" and patriarchal authority is eliminated. W. Bradford Wilcox 
& Steven L. Nock, What's Love Got to Do with It? Equality, Equity, Commitment and 
Women s Marital Quality, 84 SOC. FORCES 1321, 1322 (2006). 
3. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 162-63 (1989). 
4. For a discussion of the reduction in earning capacity associated with motherhood, 
see infra Part II.A. 
5. Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2, at 1323. For an interesting commentary on this 
study, see John Tierney, The Happiest Wives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A19 (suggest-
ing that women do more housework than men partly because housework is more impor-
tant to women). 
6. Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2, at 1328, 1332 (finding support for the hypothesis 
that even wives with egalitarian attitudes "will be happier in marriages with gender-
typical practices"); see also id. at 1340 (" ... [W]omen are not happier in marriages 
marked by egalitarian practices and beliefs."). 
203 
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modeL If even egalitarian-minded women are assuming and taking 
comfort in gender-based roles within their own homes, the law's equal-
contribution model of marriage has it wrong. The point, of course, is 
not that egalitarian marriage is a bad idea. To the contrary, mar-
riages in which spouses actually match the hours and energy they 
devote to market and family work signal an abandonment of gender-
determinative roles that has long been the goal of many feminists. 7 
The problem, however, is that conflation of aspiration and reality es-
tablishes a fictional baseline of appropriate behavior against which 
legal actors judge real spouses, often unsympathetically. 
Reexamination of the egalitarian model of marriage begins with 
identification of three myths that support it. These myths8 are simple 
enough: motherinll just happens, mothering is free, and mothering 
7. Id. at 1322. 
8. These myths are recognizable themes in The Great Mother Archetype of Jungian 
fame, a point made clear to me in a conversation with Alden Josey. Telephone interview 
with Alden Josey, Jungian analyst, (Feb. 2002). For a sample of Josey's work, see Alden 
Josey, Burn in Water, Wash in Fire: Paradox and Am biguity in the Work of Individuation, 
in MlRRORSOFTRANsFORMATION 3 (Dolores Elise Brien ed., 1995). For more on The Great 
Mother Archetype, see generally ERICH NEUMANN, THE GREAT MOTHER (Ralph Manheim 
trans., Princeton University Press 2d ed. 1963) (1955). 
A very different kind of myth about mothers is described in SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & 
MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND 
How IT HAs UNDERMINED WOMEN (2004). Douglas and Michaels are concerned about 
the rise of the "new momism:" 
the insistence that no woman is truly complete or fulfilled unless she has 
kids, that women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and that 
to be a remotely decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire physical, 
psychological, emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her children. The 
new momism is a highly romanticized and yet demanding view ofmotherhood 
in which the standards for success are impossible to meet. 
Id. at 4. The myth Douglas and Michaels describe burdens real mothers by demanding 
that they become impossible figures of perfect motherhood. The myths described in this 
article, by contrast, are myths that prevent observers from seeing real mothers as they 
actuallyare. 
9. This article assumes the broadest defmition of "mothering." Mothering thus 
includes both direct care of children and more tangentially related activities that main· 
tain the home in which children live. Under this defmition, mothering thus includes 
"physical care; playing with children; reading to children; assistance with homework; 
attending children's events; taking care of children's health care needs; and dropping 
off, picking up, and waiting for children." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, USDL No. 05·1766, AMERICAN TIME-USE SURVEY, TECHNICAL NOTES (2004) 
(defining primary childcare). Mothering also includes Katharine Silbaugh's description 
of housework: "preparing meals, washing dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shop-
ping, washing and ironing, paying bills, auto maintenance, driving ... making coffee, 
feeding the baby, emptying garbage, answering the telephone, planning family activi-
ties, making beds, caring for pets, weeding, sweeping floors ... putting clothes away." 
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1996-97». 
Mothering need not be gender specific, i.e., a father could (and many fathers do) 
undertake mothering. As Sara Ruddick has observed, "a child is mothered by whoever 
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is for babies. Each ofthese myths has an innocent, child-like quality 
that contributes to its seductiveness. Yet these myths are far from 
harmless. Taken together, they ensure that the daily realities of 
mothers' work, the economic consequences of that work and its value 
do not receive serious attention. Myth thus conveniently casts divorc-
ing mothers and fathers as equally positioned at divorce, a posture 
consistent with the premise of egalitarian marriage, which then 
justifies the economic clean-break philosophy of no-fault divorce.lO 
For real women who have lost earning capacity because of family 
responsibilities, mother myths pose great danger, threatening to 
seduce even fair-minded judges into distorted notions of equity. 11 
protects, nurtures, and trains her." Sara Ruddick, Thinking Mothers / Conceiving Birth, 
in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 29,35 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994). Ail women 
are overwhelmingly the primary caretakers of children, this article focuses on women. 
See infra Part I.A. Reserved for another day is the possibility that fathers, like mothers, 
are subject to father myths that undercut their work in the family. 
10. See generally OKIN, supra note 3, at 161-63. 
11. In our hugely discretionary divorce regime, individual trial courts are typically 
directed by statute to achieve economic equity by dividing marital property and award-
ing alimony in a way that seems fair. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for example, 
authorizes trial courts to "equitably apportion" marital property. UNIF. MARRIAGE & 
DNORCE ACT § 307, 9A U .L.A. 288 (1998) (Alternative A) [hereinafter UMDA]. Typically, 
courts are directed to consider all relevant factors in determining what equity requires. 
The UMDA, for example, directs the court to consider: 
the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial 
agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and 
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and 
needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment 
is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for 
future acquisition of capital assets and income. 
[d. Also relevant is "the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, 
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the 
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." [d. The UMDA neither 
defmes "need" nor specifies appropriate weights for the various factors. See id. 
Alimony decisionmaking is even more discretionary. Courts are typically authorized 
to award alimony to a needy spouse in an amount and for a duration the court deems 
"equitable" after considering relevant factors. The UMDA, for example, authorizes (but 
does not require) a court to award alimony to a spouse who: "(1) lacks sufficient property 
to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appro-
priate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make 
it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." 
[d. § 308(a). Once a claimant establishes need, a court may order alimony "in amounts 
and for periods of time the court deems just," after considering: 
(1) the fmancial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including 
marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs indepen-
dently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with 
the party includes a sum for that party as custodian; 
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable 
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; 
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage; 
(4) the duration of the marriage; 
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While debunking mother myths and abandoning the false egali-
tarian model they support is an important beginning, it is not enough. 
A new model of marriage must replace the old. A better model must 
reflect the reality of gender roles without entrenching those roles, 
embrace spousal equality rather than patriarchy, and understand 
the difference between equality in status and identity of contribution. 
Such a model comes from an analogy to the rules and principles of 
partnership. Partnership offers a gender-neutral vocabulary and an 
equality-based model for marriage. It also offers the essential lesson 
that spouses can be equally invested in the risks, losses, and gains 
of marriage even though their contributions to marriage differ in 
kind and quantity. 
The urgency of this reexamination of marital norms is under-
scored by publication of the American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES 
OFTHE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION. 12 In these PRINCIPLES, the ALI 
offers a helpful framework for state laws that create entitlements 
to post-divorce income sharing. 13 The danger, of course, is that state 
rule makers will be as seduced by mother myths as their predeces-
sors. At worst, new statutes will memorialize these myths, creating 
modernized, bright-line divorce regimes that punish mothers with 
even greater certainty than the discretionary regimes of current 
law. This risk, together with the inequitable treatment of divorcing 
mothers under current law,14 prompts this examination of the un-
acknowledged role of mother myths in divorce. 
Parts I through III of this article each describe a mother myth, 
subject that myth to a reality check, explain its impact on the law 
of divorce, and gauge the ALI's response as a sometimes eager, some-
times reluctant, myth slayer. Part IV briefly presents a myth-free 
alternative marriage model drawn from an analogy to partnership. 
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition ofthe spouse seeking 
maintenance; and 
(6) the ability of the [payor] spouse ... to meet his needs while meeting 
those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 
Id. § 308(b). The very broad judicial discretion inherent in such schemes invites courts 
to rely on internal moral codes and on the myths addressed in this article. 
12. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2000) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES]. 
13. The ALI leaves the details of these laws to individual rulemakers. Ai; the com-
mentary to the PRINCIPLES explains, "[i]n many cases, implementation of a Principle 
requires policy choices at a more detailed level than the Principle itself resolves. In such 
cases the Principle typically requires the adoption of statewide rules that address the 
matter on a more detailed level." Id. § 1.01 cmt. a. The appropriate rulemaker may be 
a legislature, court or administrative agency, depending on the rules of the individual 
state. Id. § 1.01 cmt. c. 
14. See generally OKIN, supra note 3, at 160-67. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 207 2006-2007
2006] MOTHERS, MYTHS, AND THE LAW OF DIVORCE 207 
It is my hope that this attempt to debunk mother myths will con-
tribute to the ultimate adoption of a partnership model of marriage 
that casts married mothers, not as impossible characters of fable, 
but rather as equal partners in the fundamentally valuable but ex-
ceedingly risky work of raising children. 
I. MOTHERING JUST HAPPENS 
The coolest mom I know who's not mine is Connor's. 
She plays soccer with him all the time. I don't think 
she has a job. She cooks. 15 
A. Invisible Mothers 
When I was a child, evidence of my mother's labor was every-
where: underwear in drawers, milk in the refrigerator, dinner on the 
table, and sometimes when I came home from school oatmeal crisps 
made with real butter . Yet it never occurred to me that any of these 
things required much effort or time. These were simply my entitle-
ments, dependably appearing, of mysterious and unimportant origin. 
Underwear in drawers just happened. 
Like other Higher Beings,16 mothers are invisible in the ordinary 
course oflife.17 In the private sphere where mothers work, no one 
watches. Daily details of mothering are largely unnoticed, drawing 
attention (and alarm) only when their absence becomes neglect. In a 
strange irony, neglectful mothers are visible; conscientious ones are 
not. 1S As Ann Crittenden observes, the "more skillful the caregiver, 
the more invisible her efforts become. Ideally, the recipients them-
selves don't even notice that they are being cared for .... "19 
15. Amy Finnerty, A Stay-At-Home Mom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 81 (quoting 
a six-year-old interviewee). A middle-class eight-year-old may view a stay-at-home mom 
as the "ultimate trophy." Id. An at-home mom confirms her children's perspective that 
"they are, in fact, the center of the universe." Id. Not surprisingly, children ranked Mom's 
job as 14 on a 15-point scale of importance (quoting a Westinghouse study). Id. 
16. Mothers are sometimes thought to be transcendental. As Thackeray observed, 
''Mother is the name for God in the lips and hearts of little children." WILLIAM MAKEPEACE 
THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR 478 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983) (1847). 
17. ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 72 (Metropolitan Books 2001). 
18. Id. 
19. &e id.; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation 
of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 776 (1993) (noting that "even within the family ... 
caregiving is largely invisible"). 
Mothers themselves reinforce the myth that mothering just happens. Consider the 
case of Harriet Beecher Stowe, who confessed to being "constantly pursued and haunted 
by the idea that I don't do anything." CRITrENDEN, supra note 17, at 53 (citing JEANNE 
BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE 
EARLY REPUBLIC 162-63 (1990». And yet in the previous year (1849), Stowe "made two 
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If mothers received payment for their work, their efforts might 
be more visible. Babysitters, nurses, housekeepers, launderers, cooks, 
seamstresses, and painters all earn paychecks in the marketplace, 
yet when they perform similar labors in their homes they are con-
sidered unemployed.20 The invisibility of mothering thus seems to 
stem not from the nature of the work itself, but rather from the fact 
that mothers are doing it. 21 The disproportionate attention paid to 
fathers who perform caretaking tasks underscores the fact that 
gender plays a critical role in visibility.22 
At its most extreme the myth that mothering just happens 
accounts for the popular, ifpeculiar, myth that full-time mothers are 
extinct, or almost extinct - swiftly disappearing relics of the Betty 
Crocker era.23 According to myth, in today's egalitarian, gender-neutral 
culture mothers and fathers co-parent, both working full-time in the 
paid economy and sharing equally in their leisure time the few family 
tasks that are really necessary.24 Accordingly, museum commentary 
references the "disappearance of full-time homemakers,"25 and the 
popular press trumpets the demise of the traditional family.26 
sofas, a chair, diverse bedspreads, pillowcases, pillows, bolsters, and mattresses; 
painted rooms; revarnished furniture; [gave] birth to her eighth child; [and ran] a huge 
household .... " CRITI'ENDEN, supra note 17, at 53. 
20. Katharine Silbaugh has urged more serious consideration of the economics of 
home labor. See Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women:S Household Labor, 
9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 83 (1997). 
21. See id. at 82 (discussing whether housework is "viewed as a commodity is con· 
textual, not activity-based"). 
22. As Justice Bird observed, a decision maker may glorify a father because he "often 
prepared the child's breakfast and dinner and picked her up from the day care center 
himself [though it] is difficult to imagine a mother's performance of these chores even 
attracting notice, much less commendable comment." Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 
495-96 n.6 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring). Justice Bird further noted that, this 
double standard is curiously two-edged when it comes to mothers. Even as a mother's 
presence in the home is invisible, her absence as she participates in the paid economy 
is conspicuous and may be viewed as evidence that she has abandoned her motherly 
duties. Fathers, however, are not only very visible in their caretaking efforts but are ex-
pected to invest in the paid economy and are certainly not suspected of having aban-
doned their families when they do so. Id. at 496; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN 
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS, 69 (1989) (reporting 
"[s]tereotypes that influence some judges and that disadvantage mothers include" the 
view that "[flathers who exhibit any interest in parenting should be granted custody 
despite years of primary caretaking by mothers"). 
23. Cynthia Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom and Divorce: A Message 
from Detergent Manufacturers, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 285, 287 (1997). 
24. Id. at 288-89. 
25. A particularly poignant example of this rhetoric appeared in New York's Cooper-
Hewitt Exhibit on Mechanical Brides. Next to a 1961 photo on display, museum com-
mentary noted the "disappearance offull-time homemakers." Id. at 287. For a discussion 
of this rhetoric see generally id. 
26. A New York Times article, for example, touted the fact that the two-working. 
parent family has become a fifty-one percent majority of all two-parent families. Tamar 
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Yet, empirical studies reveal that large numbers of married 
mothers are working full-time in their homes, especially when their 
children are young.27 In 2004, 50.7 percent of married women with 
children under age one did not participate in the paid labor force, 
an increase of 2.9 percent since 1997.28 In fact, although not widely 
publicized, the labor force participation of married women with chil-
dren under age one has declined every year since 1998.29 Also in 2004, 
43.1 percent of married women with children under age six did not 
participate in the paid labor force, an increase over 2003 figures,30 
and 26.9 percent of married women with children between ages six 
and seventeen did not participate in the paid labor force. 31 The point 
is not that full-time mothering is good or bad, wise or unwise, but 
only that it is really happening. 
Even when a married mother works outside her home she likely 
serves as the primary family caretaker, undertaking a dispropor-
tionately large share of household chores. In 2004, adult women in 
households with children under age six spent 2.7 hours daily in 
primary childcare, as compared with 1.2 hours for men in similar 
households.32 In households with children under age eighteen, the 
Lewin, Now a Majority: Families With 2 Parents Who Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, 
at A20. What is surprising is actually the flip side of this figure: in forty-nine percent 
of two-parent families, one or both parents do not work outside the home. This latter 
figure is actually the more newsworthy because it suggests that our view oftwo working 
parents as the normative family structure has but a tenuous claim to reality. 
27. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2004, tbl. 6 (2005) [hereinafter BLS-2005J. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. at tbl. 4. In 1999, only about forty percent of married women with children 
under age six worked full-time in the market, twenty percent worked part-time, and 
almost forty percent were not employed in the market at all. CRITTENDEN, supra note 
17, at 277 n.8 (citing Steve Hipple, Bureau of Labor Statistics). In 1993, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics reported that, while ninety-six percent of fathers worked outside the 
home, only sixty-five percent of mothers did so. See Family and Medical Leave Act Poster 
and Background Paper, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 141, July 26, 1993, at D-25 (cited 
in 44 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 52 n. 4). In 1991, the Bureau of Labor Statistics counted sixteen 
million married women who were not in the labor force because they were "keeping 
house" (as compared with 415,000 men). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, 39 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, No.1 at 204, tbl. 35 (1992). 
31. BLS-2005, supra note 27, at tbl. 4. In 1999, twenty-nine percent of married women 
between ages twenty-five and fifty-four with children under age eighteen worked exclu-
sively in their homes. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 17 (citing an unpublished March 
1999 Current Population Survey). Approximately twenty percent of these mothers were 
officially classified as "working," although their work was part-time, a category that 
includes those "employed for as little as one hour a week," those "merely looking for 
paid work," and those who work without compensation for at least five hours a week in 
a family business. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 18. 
32. BUREAU OF LABoR STATISTICS, U.S. DEF'T OF LABoR,AMERICANTIME-USE SURVEY, 
TECHNICAL NOTES tbl. 9 (2004). The Bureau's definition of "primary childcare" includes 
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comparable figures were 1.8 hours per day (for women) and 0.8 hours 
per day (for men)}3 When one expands the definition of mothering to 
include activities in the home less directly related to children, the dis-
parity between the family workloads of men and women is startling. 
David Demo and Alan Acock, for example, report that women con-
tinue to assume seventy to eighty percent of all housework.34 
Yet, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the myth 
continues that Betty Crocker35 and Soccer Mom36 have disappeared. 
Perhaps, however, this gap between rhetoric and reality is just a 
temporary problem that will disappear as older mothers are replaced 
by younger ones with more egalitarian views. Surely in this equal-
opportunity, co-parenting, post-Mystique era,37 younger women will 
"physical care; playing with children; reading to children; assistance with homework; 
attending children's events; taking care of children's health care needs; and dropping off, 
picking up, and waiting for children." Id. at tbl. 9. This definition of childcare thus excludes 
time spent in activities that benefit children, but that are less directly related to childcare, 
such as preparing meals, shopping, cleaning house, and stocking underwear drawers. 
33. Id. at tbl. 9; see also Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 177, n.21 (2000) (citing several studies reporting that women spend more 
hours in home care than men, including one report that "mothers of pre-school age 
children spent 100 hours more per month than men in childcare"). 
34. David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic 
Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1993); see also 
FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES, No FAMILIES?: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 111 (1991) (reporting that in households 
where both spouses work outside the home, "employed wives seem simply to add the 
demands of a job to their traditional responsibilities of running a household"); ARLIE 
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 8 (1989) (citing a study in which husbands performed 
half of household work in only twenty percent of dual· earner families; none of the hus· 
bands studied did more); Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 10 (observing that women spend 
more than half their working hours on housework while men spend less than one-fourth 
of their working hours on housework); see also Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage 
Rates and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1 
(2000); Steven Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971 (2000). 
35. "Betty Crocker" is used here to refer to a full-time homemaker. See infra note 37. 
36. "Soccer Mom" is used here to refer to a primary homemaker who also works in 
the paid economy, either part·time or full-time. The term "soccer mom" was coined by 
Susan Casey in her 1995 campaign for Denver City Council. See Christopher Cox, Original 
Soccer Mom Spurs Kick, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 24, 1996, at 1. In Casey's words: 
Id. 
We arrange our lives around our kids and support them ... I wanted 
people to understand that. I've been a teacher, I have a Ph.D., I've managed 
national presidential campaigns, but when I wake up in the morning and 
when I go to bed at night, my heart and soul are in my family. 
37. Over forty years have passed since The Feminine Mystique challenged the norm 
of homemaking as feminine destiny. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE 
MYSTIQUE (1962). When The Feminine Mystique was published in 1962, it sparked a 
revolution against Betty Crocker, the full· time homemaker, who according to 1950s 
rhetoric, represented women's sole opportunity for happiness. Such illusions about 
feminine destiny, argued Friedan, cause women to abandon their dreams, forfeit their 
selves and generally fall victim to the "housewife's trap." Id. at 338. The revolution 
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not make the same decisions about mothering as their mothers. Or 
will they? According to some reports, younger mothers are increas-
ingly choosing full-time homemaking,38 and in this post-September-11 
era, with its renewed longing for the comforts of hearth and home,39 
Betty Crocker and Soccer Mom may well become an even more daily 
reality. Such a possibility would help explain the peculiar popularity 
of pastel and fire-engine red KitchenAid Mixers, new millennial ren-
ditions of a homemaking favorite from an era supposedly long gone.40 
B. The Law of The Invisible Mother 
The law of divorce too often assumes mothering just happens. 
Under this view: 
care of the house and children can be done with one hand tied 
behind the back. Send the kids out to school, put them to bed, 
and the rest of the time free to play tennis and bridge.41 
As one court observed, in justifying short-term alimony to a full-time 
mother of three minor children: "I don't think she would want to sit 
around the rest of her life. My God, she will turn into a vegetable if 
she did that anyhow."42 Evidently, mothering requires little effort or 
time - not enough to interfere with a mother's ability and responsi-
bility to pursue a real job. So myth has it. 
against domesticity, however, has not eliminated at-home mothers. See supra notes 27-
31 and accompanying text. 
38. A Change of Place, BARRON'S, Mar. 21, 1994, at 34 (citing Bureau of Labor statis-
tics showing that "[a]fter three decades of growth, labor force participation by women 
appears to be slowing, with Generation X driving the trend"); see also Lisa Belkin, The 
Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (reporting that 
middle-class women are increasingly choosing full-time homemaking); Peggy O'Crowley, 
More Women are Choosing to Make a Career Out of Raising Their Children, NEWHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2002, at B1, http://www.newhousenews.comlarchive/story1b04 
1902.html (reporting that "[f1or the fIrst time in 25 years, the seemingly unstoppable 
advance of mothers going back to work after having a baby has reversed"). 
39. See, e.g., David Handelman, In Pensive Times, Comfort Magazines Find an 
Audience, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at ell (noting the post-September-ll success of 
magazines with "a reassuring touch ... in some way underpinning a sense of home and 
comfort"); see also Patricia Leigh Brown, Losing Her Heart to a Wooded House in the 
Prairie Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at G1 ("To feel at home. It's an emotional 
connection, an intangible tug of the heart."). 
40. For a picture of a lavender KitchenAid mixer and an observation on its appeal, see 
William L. Hamilton, Seeing the Future in All Its Hues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at F1. 
41. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force 
Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1987) (describing the view of some New York 
legislators). 
42. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 67, 306 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Wis. 1981). For a 
discussion of this case, see Estin, supra note 19, at 732. 
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As long as their marriages remain intact, many married mothers 
are protected from the impact of the law's distorted perceptions of 
mothering. For those whose marriages end, however, the consequences 
of the myth that mothering just happens can be devastating. Faced 
with a judge vested with broad discretion to achieve economic equity,43 
mothers who have forgone or significantly limited market partici-
pation to assume primary home responsibilities will face an inevi-
table question: "What have you been doing with all your time?"The 
question, of course, is rhetorical, and the answer inescapable: "I've 
been doing nothing, really - sitting on the sofa eating bonbons 
(while the cooking, the cleaning, the shopping, the laundering, the 
tutoring, the grooming, the chauffeuring, the listening, the disciplin-
ing and the stocking of underwear drawers just happened)." The 
judicial response is predictable and unequivocal: "Then shame on you. 
You have brought your economic troubles on yourself. '44 
The law of the invisible mother supports the complementary 
notion that monetizing home work is an inapt, futile endeavor that 
threatens to destroy the Higher Being45 status of mothers. 46 If mother-
ing just happens without the intervention of human hands, then 
attempting to place a worldly value on it would be inappropriate, 
indeed foolish. The implication of such reasoning is clear enough: a 
43. See supra note 11. 
44. For a discussion of the Excessive Mother (as opposed to the slothful mother) who 
has allegedly spent too much time mothering her children, see infra Part III. 
45. See THACKERAY, supra note 16. 
46. According to commodification critics, because market concepts cannot fully capture 
the value in intimate relationships, they threaten to destroy that value. As Margaret 
Jane Radin explains, "many kinds of particulars - one's politics, work, religion, family, 
love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, charac-
ter, and personal attributes [are] ... integral to the self. To understand any of these as 
monetizable ... is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human." 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1905-06 (1987). 
Simply put, commodification skeptics believe "talk matters: you can pervert the personal-
ness of something by talking about it as if it were fungible." Silbaugh, supra note 20, at 
85-86. 
Katharine Silbaugh powerfully critiques this notion, arguing that it is actually the 
refusal to monetize mothers' domestic chores, rather than such monetization, that 
threatens to diminish mothering. Id. As Silbaugh explains, an activity may have '"plural 
meanings:' multiple understandings of a single activity that can co-exist." Id. at 96-100. 
Commodification anxiety, concludes Silbaugh, ''protects'' women by leaving them "without 
cash in the name of non-commodification." Id. at 95. Vicki Schultz, however, worries that 
while "[n]o self-respecting feminist could be against 'valuing housework,"' this process 
might "encourage women to concentrate on housework and child care at the expense of 
a deep commitment to paid work." Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 
1900-11 (2000). 
For a reference on the commodification debate, see generally RETHINKING COMMODI-
FICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAw AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. 
Williams eds., 2005). 
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divorcing mother who has contributed no real value to marriage has 
earned no right to share in any economic fruits of marriage.47 
C. The ALI Response 
Hope for a more realistic view of the reality of mothering comes 
from the American Law Institute (ALI). In its PRINCIPLES, the ALI 
bravely confronts the myth that mothering just happens: 
[D]espite the dramatic changes in the workforce participation of 
married women over the last several decades, marital roles have 
persisted and their impact on the work experiences of married 
women remains great. Whether or not women actually leave full-
time employment after the birth of their children, studies consis-
tently show that they usually perform far more than half of the 
married couple's domestic chores.48 
As the ALI sees it, mothers are at work in both the market and the 
home, caring for children and washing underwear, undertaking re-
sponsibilities disproportionate49 to those of their spouses. 
Accordingly, the ALI offers a new alimony model designed espe-
cially for primary caretakers. 50 Under this model, a presumption arises 
that a spouse's disparately low earning capacity (in relation to the 
other spouse) is the result of service as the family's primary care-
taker. 51 A mother is thus presumptively entitled to alimony if her 
earning capacity is substantially less than that of her husband. This 
scheme turns the myth that mothering just happens on its head, 
47. Many states list the contribution of a homemaker to the acquisition of assets as 
a factor for the court to consider as it attempts to equitably distribute marital property 
and determine the appropriate amount and duration of any alimony award. See IRA 
MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 287-88 (4th ed. 2004). 
48. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d. (emphasis added, 
citations omitted). 
49. Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c. 
50. Id. §5.05 (1) and (2). 
51. Id. §5.05 (2) provides: 
Entitlement to an award under this section should be determined by a rule 
of statewide application under which a presumption of entitlement arises 
at the dissolution of a marriage in which 
(a) there are or have been marital children, or children of either spouse; 
(b) while under the age of majority the children have lived with the claimant 
(or with both spouses, when the claim is against the stepparent of the 
children), for a minimum period specified in the rule; and 
(c) the claimant's earning capacity at dissolution is substantially less than 
that of the other spouse. 
Id. The PRINCIPLES' alimony model is again discussed at infra notes 98-107 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the market costs of mothering, see infra Part I1.A. 
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presuming that mothering does happen and leaving it to a higher-
income spouse to prove otherwise. 52 While the ALI's reconceptual-
ized alimony scheme raises other more problematic issues, 53 its frank 
recognition of the reality of family caretaking is encouraging. 
Although the ALI seems eager to recognize the reality of quasi-
traditional marriages, it is oddly reluctant to recognize the continu-
ing reality of traditional marriages. 54 The ALI, for example, contrasts 
"the historical pattern in which wives were financially dependent 
upon their husbands"55 with "the more usual modern arrangement 
in which both spouses are employed outside the home.,,56 While the 
ALI acknowledges that family responsibilities often precipitate gaps 
in women's employment, 57 such gaps are cast as aberrations from 
more ordinary work patterns. Some of the ALI's language seems to 
discount the reality of full-time mothers altogether. "In the late 
20th century ... universal adult labor force participation is both the 
empirical norm and the norm generally assumed .... "58 
What about the 50.7 percent of married women with children 
under age one who did not work outside their homes in 2004, the 43 
percent with children under age six who did not work outside their 
homes, and the 26.9 percent with children between ages six and 
seventeen who did not work outside their homes?59 These at-home 
mothers will no doubt be surprised to discover that they lie outside 
the generally assumed norm. 
Notwithstanding its disappointing treatment of traditional mar-
riages, the ALI's partial success in slaying the myth that mothering 
just happens is a step forward. Until fully slain, however, the myth 
52. PRINCIPLES §5.05 (3) provides: 
A presumption of entitlement governs in the absence of a determination by 
the trial court that the claimant did not provide substantially more than 
half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the children. 
53. Id. Unfortunately, the ALI's choice of a loss-based model rather than a contri-
bution model for alimony unnecessarily casts mothers as victims rather than partners 
and sends a dispiriting message about the status of married mothers. For a critique of 
the ALI's theoretical model for alimony, see Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: 
Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWAL. REV. 1513, 1527-34 (2005) [herein-
after Mothers as Suckers]. 
54. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.04 cmt. c. 
55.Id. 
56.Id. 
57. The term "gappers" refers to women who have taken at least one break from work 
of six months or longer after attaining their last educational degree. Joyce Jacobsen & 
Laurence Levin, The Effects of Intermittent Labor Force Attachment on Female Earnings, 
18 MONTHLY LAB. REV., 14, 15 (Sept. 1995). Gappers include women who drop out of the 
market for reasons other than family responsibilities, including layoffs, ill health, or 
migration. Id. at 16. 
58. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.03 cmt. d. 
59. BLS-2005, supra note 27, at tbl. 4. 
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will continue to cast mothers, especially at-home mothers, as lazy, in-
ferior characters who may generate pity, but who deserve neither 
respect nor economic entitlements at divorce. The myth that mother-
ing just happens will also deter legal actors from inquiring into the 
market consequences of mothering, thus contributing to the com-
plementary myth that mothering is free. 
II. MOTHERING IS FREE 
[AJny woman - no matter her age or lack of 
training - can find a nice little job and a nice 
little apartment and conduct her later years as she 
might have done at age 25. 60 
A. The Cost-Free Mother 
If mothering just happens, it must also be free. As. a child, I never 
considered that mothering imposed costs. By doing the laundry, the 
shopping, the cooking, and the cleaning, my mother invested time 
and energy that limited her opportunity to do other things. I am sure 
I never once considered the possibility that in the time my mother 
spent monitoring and laundering my underwear she could have been 
reading a book or investing creative energy at the office. If mothering 
was costly my mother never told me. I thought mothering was free. 
According to myth, mothering imposes no market costs on women. 
It is, rather, a spare-time activity that barely detracts from a woman's 
participation in the paid economy. Mothering thus precipitates no 
loss in human capital and leaves mothers and fathers in the same eco-
nomic position at divorce. Indeed, to view mothers as economically 
disadvantaged by mothering is insulting to women. So myth has it. 
The truth, however, is that mothering is not free. It exacts a 
significant price from mothers in the form oflost market opportuni-
ties. Simply put, time spent laboring in the home is time not spent 
laboring in the market, and as mothers limit their investment in a 
job or career, their ability to generate income decreases. Ultimately, 
mothers lose some opportunities altogether. The realities of de-
preciating human capital impact many types of mothers: full time 
housewives, who forgo market employment altogether; gappers, 
who periodically drop out of the job market; and the many primary 
homemakers, who continually compromise their market engage-
ment to assume a major portion of family responsibilities. 
60. Schafran, supra note 41, at 285 (quoting a New York legislator's description of 
distorted judicial perspectives). 
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Empirical studies confIrm that mothers do indeed pay a market 
price for their work in the home.61 Recent data suggest that the long-
reported wage gap between income-earning men and women is more 
closely linked to mothering than to gender alone.62 Indeed, when one 
compares the incomes of childless men and women, the wage gap 
narrows considerably. Diana Furchtgott-Roth and Christine Stolba 
found that in 1993, childless women (age twenty-seven to thirty-
three) earned ninety-eight percent as much as childless men in the 
same age groUp.63 This finding is consistent with the much-cited 
work of Victor Fuchs, who reported that the hourly wages of women, 
but not men, decline proportionately with the number of children in 
the household.64 
The costs of mothering are most evident in the case of displaced 
homemakers, long-term Betty Crockers who have spent their most 
career-productive years in the home rather than the market.65 Evi-
dence of the financial vulnerability of these women is unmistakable, 
largely because their opportunity costs have been actualized and thus 
are easily demonstrable. 66 If their marriages end, these women cannot 
simply return to the marketplace armed with a resume listing "mom" 
as previous work experience and easily compete with workers twenty 
years younger. Time lost in the home cannot often be reclaimed when 
the home is lost. For the full-time homemaker of many years, divorce 
ruthlessly shatters any pretense that mothers can recapture years 
spent washing underwear. 
Even temporary withdrawals from paid employment to care for 
children can impact earning capacity, perhaps indefinitely. Joyce 
Jacobsen and Laurence Levin report that "women whose labor force 
gap occurred more than 20 years ago still earn between 5 percent 
and 7 percent less than women who never left the labor force and 
have comparable levels of experience."67 
61. See generally CRITTENDEN, supra note 17. 
62. See generally Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53. 
63. DIANA FvRCHTGOTI'-ROTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA, WOMEN'S FIGURES: THE ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 8 (1996). According to Columbia professor Jane 
Waldfogel, "the family gap between women with children and women without children 
has been rising in recent years, even as the gender gap between women and men has 
been narrowing." Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women 
with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 143 (1998). 
64. VICTOR FuCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 61-62 (1988). For 
women, concludes Fuchs, "the greatest barrier to economic equality is children." Id. at 
147; see also Waldfogel, supra note 63, at 153 (stating that Fuch's observation "is at 
least as true today as it was a decade ago"). 
65. See generally Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse 
on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993) [hereinafter Displaced Homemaker]. 
66. See generally id. 
67. Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 57, at 18. The researchers' hypothetical case of a 
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Easiest to ignore are the market costs incurred by primary home-
makers, typically mothers, who combine market employment with 
a second shift as primary family caretaker. 68 These mothers often 
work part-time or part-year, but even those who work full-time, year-
round, are likely to limit their market investment to perform primary 
caretaking responsibilities. 69 As Congress recognized in the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, a caretaker's home responsibilities often limit 
her career choice and advancement.7o Indeed, many women "choose 
work that will fit around ... their family responsibilities, a complica-
tion and impediment to occupational advancement not faced by most 
men.'>71 As Jerry Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson observe, a primary inci-
dent of motherhood is reduced working time. 72 From an employer's per-
spective, a primary homemaker is simply not an "ideal worker.,,73 
. Whether she is a full-time homemaker, a gapper, or a primary 
homemaker, a mother's efforts in the home are likely to reduce her 
earnings in the paid economy. Unfortunately, the law seems loath to 
acknowledge this reality. 
B. The Law of the Cost-Free Mother 
No-fault divorce laws invite judges to entertain the myth that 
mothering is free. This invitation is fundamentally grounded in the 
underlying philosophy of no-fault divorce. The basic scheme of no-
fault is to allow easy access to divorce without a showing of fault 74 and 
sometimes at the will of only one spouse. 75 The law has abandoned 
woman who dropped out of the paid labor force from age twenty-five to age thirty-two 
illustrates the impact of these figures. [d. This woman's seven-year gap in employment 
cost her ten years of earnings. [d. 
68. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34. 
69. See Demo and Acock, supra note 34, at 325-26. 
70. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1996). 
71. BUREAUOFTHECENSUS, U.S.DEP'TOFCOM., WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 
SERIES P-23, No. 146, at 7 (1986). 
72. JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DMDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND 
GENDER INEQUALITY 111 (2004). These researchers note, for example, that working 
women are more likely than working men to stay home when child-care arrangements 
fail or when a child is sick. [d. at 90. Ann Crittenden cites a 1996 study in which married 
mothers who worked outside their homes averaged 1,197 hours in paid employment, as 
compared with 2,132 hours for married fathers. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 18 (citing 
Deborah Fallows in a 1996 panel discussion at the HarvardlRadclifl'e twenty-fifth reunion). 
73. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1 (2000) (describing a gender-based 
system of "domesticity, " consisting of an ideal worker "who works full time and overtime 
and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing" and a marginalized care-
giver who supports his ideal worker status). 
74. The specific grounds for a fault-based divorce vary by state. Typical grounds are 
adultery, desertion, and cruelty. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 207. 
75. Although rarely acknowledged in no-fault statutes, most no-fault divorce laws 
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old notions of divorce as a remedy for a wronged spouse in favor of the 
more pragmatic, less moralistic notion that divorce is merely legal 
recognition that a marriage has died, if not of its own volition, then 
at least without any identified fault by either party.76 Free of blame, 
each spouse is thus entitled to begin life anew, free of the shackles 
of a dead relationship. To the extent these shackles include eco-
nomic entanglements, then those too must be severed. Just as neither 
spouse is responsible for failure of the marriage, neither is responsible 
for the other's financial situation. Each spouse deserves a fresh start, 
a clean break that severs both the parties' legal status and their 
financial rights and responsibilities. So the no-fault storyline reads. 
In practical terms, this clean -break principle encourages judges 
in our hugely discretionary regime 77 to settle all equities between the 
spouses through a one-time division of property and to deny or se-
verely limit alimony.78 If alimony is unavoidable,79 it should be limited 
to the smallest amount necessary for a spouse's retraining, i.e., for 
rehabilitation to enable the damaged spouse to begin a new life as 
a productive citizen this time around.80 More extensive alimony would 
effectively authorize divorce at the will of one spouse. See id. at 222 (noting that "while 
the law in the books does not recognize unilateral divorce, in most states the law in 
action does"). 
76. No·fault statutes come in two types: "marital breakdown standards" and living 
"separate and apart" standards. [d. at 219. 
77. See supra text accompanying note 11. For a discussion of the discretionary 
nature of property division and alimony, see Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 
92·95, 101·06. 
78. As the Official Comment to the UMDA § 308 explains: 
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 [on property division] is 
to encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by 
property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the 
available property is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who 
seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills 
and interests or is occupied with child care mayan award of maintenance 
be ordered. 
UMDA, supra note 11, § 308, Official Comment. 
Even under fault· based divorce laws, parties usually received a clean break, as evi· 
denced by the surprisingly small number of cases in which alimony was ordered. In 
1990, the Census Bureau reported that 16.8 percent of the 19.3 million ever· divorced and 
currently separated women (as of 1987) were entitled to receive alimony under a divorce 
decree. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'r OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS-
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, SERIES P·23, No. 167 at 11 (1990). Curious then is 
the comment in the UMDA Prefatory Note that "the Act does not continue the traditional 
reliance upon maintenance as the primary means of support for divorced spouses." UMDA, 
supra note 11, at Prefatory Note. 
79. The level of need required to qualify a claimant for alimony is unclear. "Need" 
has no precise definition and could conceivably be tested against a variety of compar· 
ative baselines, including the federal poverty level or, more generously, against the 
standard of living during marriage. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 380-82. 
80. See, e.g., UMDA, supra note 11, § 308(b). The word "rehabilitation" suggests a 
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inappropriately and unnecessarily prolong the economic agony of a 
dead marriage and send a negative message about women's depen-
dency on men. 81 If the critical alimony question is thus "how much 
time will it take to repair an economically needy mother?" Myth 
supplies an easy answer: "very little, since mothering is free." 
The clean-break principle and its supporting mother myth pose 
significant danger for real mothers. Most obviously, judges are 
tempted to overlook disparate economic positioning resulting from 
marital roles and to ignore the reality that a mother who has worked 
exclusively or primarily in her home during marriage is not likely 
to be the market equal of her husband who has more fully invested 
in paid employment.82 If disparate positioning really exists it spoils 
everything. If the parties do not own much property, a common fact 
pattern,83 then a court can not achieve equity by awarding the lower 
income spouse a larger share of marital property. In such cases, 
clean-break principles conflict with principles of equity. Pretending 
that homemaking has not imposed market costs avoids this conflict. 
It is easier to deny the costs of mothering than to reconcile income 
disparities with clean-break principles. It is easier to insist that if 
income disparity exists, it is the product of a mother's poor work 
blame-the· victim perspective, as if mothers are criminals in need of rescue from their 
lives of vice. For a discussion of the expectation of rehabilitation as a limitation on the 
duration of alimony, see ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 400-01. 
81. Some participants in the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s took the 
position that women, as the equals of men, do not need the fmancial support of their ex· 
husbands. See BETTY FruEDAN, IT CHANGED My LIFE 325·26 (1976). 
The women's movement had just begun when the so-called divorce reform 
law was passed. At that time, we were so concerned with principle - that 
equality of right and opportunity had to mean equality of responsibility, 
and therefore alimony was out - that we did not realize the trap we were 
falling into. 
See also Susan Westerberg Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in 
RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS Ill, 123 (Barrie Thome & Marilyn 
Yalom eds., 1982) (noting that California feminists failed to see the economic effects of 
no-fault divorce on women); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, 
Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of 
the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 853-85 (observing that Wisconsin 
reformers mistakenly believed that injustice could be avoided by treating marriage as 
a partnership of equals and equally dividing marital property). But see SUSAN FALUDI, 
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 20 (1991) (arguing that 
feminists had virtually no involvement with divorce-law reform). 
82. See Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 57. 
83. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's 
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 662·63 (1991) 
(indicating divorcing couples in New York usually had less than $25,000 in divisible 
assets); Ilene E. Shapiro & Barry P. Schatz, Has the Illinois Equitable Distribution 
Statute Advanced the Cause of the Homemaker?, 1986 ILL. B.J. 492, 500 (noting that 
"most estates are too small to support anyone"). 
HeinOnline -- 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 220 2006-2007
220 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:203 
ethic or intellect or of society's bias. A mother's predicament is thus 
her fault or society's fault and therefore appropriately ignored at 
divorce. Certainly it is not a husband's responsibility, for we are clear 
on the point that mothering is free. 
Indeed, the history of no-fault divorce law is a sad tale of denial 
of the costs of mothering. Most distressing is the case of the full-
time homemaker whose marriage ends after many years of care-
taking. Early no-fault courts often seemed unaware of the costs of 
mothering even for these women. Seduced by egalitarian visions of 
housewives retrained and entering the job market, too many courts 
abruptly freed long-term homemakers to begin new lives - with 
limited property, little if any support, and years of absence from the 
job market.84 For these Betty Crockers, divorce occasioned a sea 
change, not only in status but in economics, as they lost the family 
wage and often the family home.85 At worst, a long-term caregiver 
was treated as a ''breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of 
fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted to cheap 
steaks when past her prime."86 Concerned commentators cried foul, 
task forces were launched to explore the possibility of gender bias 
in the COurtS,87 and a myriad of divorce reform proposals were promul-
gated to deal more fairly with displaced homemakers.88 Task forces 
partly attributed divorce inequities to gender bias in the courts,89 
and surely this is a factor, but a fuller explanation lies in the myth 
that mothering is free. 
84. See Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 78-85. 
85. See id. at 85-96. 
86. In re Marriage of Branter, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
87. For a general description of gender bias in the courts, see ABA ISSUES HANDBOOK 
(Jan. 2002) ("Gender bias in the courtroom generally takes three forms: stereotyping 
the nature and roles of women and men; devaluing women and what is perceived as 
women's work; and acting on myths and misconceptions about the social and economic 
realities of women's and men's lives."). See genercdly Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the 
Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 55 (1987); Schafran, supra note 4l. 
88. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 3, at 182-83; June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining 
the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359 (1994); Displaced Homemaker, 
supra note 65; Martha Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing 
Women s Work Through Premarital &curity Agreements, 77 TEx. L. REV. 17 (1998); Estin, 
supra note 19; Joan M. Krauskopf, Comments on Income Sharing: Redefining the Family 
in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 417 (1994); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: 
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Jana B. Singer, 
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989). 
89. See, e.g., MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE 
COURTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (1989) (rmding that "resolution of 
economic issues is often premised on misconceptions about the economic consequences 
of divorce for women"). 
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Some commentators claim the law is moving toward a more 
realistic and more humane treatment of displaced homemakers.90 
Hopefully they are right. However, the continuing vitality of the 
clean-break philosophy suggests that no-fault divorce laws have not ' 
altogether escaped their history. Indeed, even as the law may be 
moving toward more realistic views of the cost of mothering for 
long-term homemakers, it appears stubbornly resistant to evidence 
that primary homemakers, who combine market and family work, 
also experience market costs. 91 A primary homemaker's market par-
ticipation may be exaggerated and her home efforts minimized in 
order to create the illusion of a fully egalitarian marriage that facili-
tates conscience-free application ofthe clean-break principle. Yet even 
after divorce this younger mother's market losses will continue to 
accrue as she undertakes primary caretaking responsibilities, 92 often 
with less help from her children's father than while their marriage 
was intact. While such a mother may benefit incidentally from child 
support, such support will not compensate her for the depreciation 
in human capital caused by market disinvestment.93 Child support, 
by definition, aims to provide for children and not for the mother who 
cares for them.94 
The temptation to ignore the costs of mothering, especially in the 
case of younger mothers, is made more compelling by the law's tradi-
tional reluctance to recognize lost opportunities as compensable losses. 
Although contracting parties understand the reality oflost opportu-
nities' the law traditionally has viewed them as too speculative to 
warrant recovery because it generally does not award damages for 
the lost opportunity to have contracted with a more reliable partner 
or to have entered into a more lucrative contract.95 A mother's claim 
90. These claims reach at least as far back as Joan Krauskopfs 1988 observation of 
an appellate trend "to preserve indefmite alimony by curbing the excesses of rehabili· 
tative alimony." Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited 
Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (1988). 
91. See generally Estin, supra note 19. 
92. See WILLIAMS, supra note 73, at 126. In close to ninety percent of divorces, mothers 
obtain primary physical custody of children. ElLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 57l. 
93. See Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 79-80. 
94. As one court explained in addressing the case of a nonmarital child: "to raise [the 
mother's] standard of living through the vehicle of child support would constitute the im· 
position of an unauthorized obligation on part of the father toward the mother." State v. 
Hall, 418 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Kathy G.J. Arnold D., 501 N.Y.S.2d 
58, 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986». 
95. As Allan Farnsworth explains, 
[I]t is important to understand that the law has not generally recognized 
yet another kind of reliance - reliance that consists in forgoing opportu· 
nities to make other contracts. In the example given, the builder may have 
passed up another job, and the owner may have passed up the possibility 
of hiring another builder in reliance on their contract. But the difficulties 
of proving this are obvious, and courts have not been receptive to claims 
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that she lost market opportunities because of mothering may trigger 
this traditional response, for until her childcare years end, her depre-
ciated human capital will be partly or fully hypothetical and there-
fore easy to deny. Even when a mother's depreciated human capital is 
evident, determining the extent of that depreciation will be difficult 
or impossible, for rarely will there be a comparative baseline against 
which to measure a mother's best alternative opportunity, i.e., what 
she would have become but for mothering.96 Primary homemakers 
may indeed be "just a man away from poverty,,97 but because they are 
not yet in poverty, it is easy to pretend that mothering is free. 
C. The ALI Response 
The ALI's success as a myth slayer lies primarily in its candid 
recognition of the costs of primary caretaking. These costs are ''both 
significant and common," says the ALI, and "cannot be ignored by the 
law."98 The ALI frankly acknowledges that "women's relative wage 
declines in nearly a straight line with the number of children in the 
household."99 Moreover, "the birth of children usually affects the earn-
ing capacity of women who continue to work full time as well as those 
who do not."lOO As the ALI observes: 
Economic studies demonstrate that responsibility for the care of 
children ordinarily has a significant continuing impact on parental 
earning capacity. This effect is not limited to parents who withdraw 
from full-time employment, but occurs also among primary care-
takers who continue full-time market labor. 101 
based on this kind of reliance. 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
96. For discussion of such a lost-opportunity model, see Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory 
of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3, 40-48 (1989). 
97. NATIONAL DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS NETWORK, THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... A 
STATUS REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980S 60 
(1990). Middle-class women are especially vulnerable to divorce laws. For low-income 
women divorce perpetuates, but does not initiate, poverty. For upper-class women, 
property is often significant, so that even half of the marital property will sustain a 
comfortable standard ofliving. For middle-income homemakers, however, property may 
be scant and income-earning ability compromised by primary caretaking responsi-
bilities. As Herma Hill Kay observed, "marriage, it seems, is both a long-term cause and 
a short-term cure offemale poverty." Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-fault: New Directions 
in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 30 (Steven D. Sugarman 
& Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
98. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 cmt. d. "[W]ives continue, in the great majority 
of cases," adds the ALI, "to sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for their children . .. " 
Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c. (emphasis added). 
99. Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d. 
100.Id. 
101. Id. 
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The ALI's answer to a mother's disparate financial positioning 
at divorce is to craft a new alimony scheme in which a presumption 
of entitlement arises if: (1) children lived with the claimant for a 
minimum specified period and (2) a claimant's earning capacity is 
"substantially less" than that of her spouse. l02 Under this scheme, 
"the inference that child-care responsibilities adversely affected the 
claimant's earning capacity is not rebuttable,"103 largely because 
although the link between care of children and earning capacity loss 
can be established generally, 
it is often difficult to show in the particular case. And even where 
the fact ofloss may be clear enough, its size often cannot be estab-
lished because of the speculation inherent in comparing the actual 
facts with the hypothetical facts that would have developed had 
the parties behaved differently years earlier.104 
The ALI's rationale for its primary-caretaker alimony scheme lies 
in the proposition that a mother should not bear the entire financial 
cost of her role since "the cost of raising the couple's children is their 
joint responsibility.,,105 
Although it casts alimony as an entitlement to loss-sharing, the 
ALI makes alimony modifiable upon changed circumstances. Among 
these circumstances is a recipient's remarriage, 106 which the ALI sees 
as "the divorced woman['s] ... surest path to financial recovery.'>107 
Something disturbing, if not familiar, lies in the suggestion that a 
woman's financial future depends on her ability to find a replace-
ment male provider .108 Mothers are not fungible underwear washers 
102. Id. § 5.05(2). For the full text of this section, see supra note 51. 
103. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 cmt. d. 
104.Id. 
105. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a. 
106. PRINCIPLES § 5.07 provides in pertinent part: 
An obligation to make periodic payments ... ends automatically at the 
remarriage of the obligee ... without regard to the award's term as fIxed 
in the decree, unless either (1) the original decree provides otherwise, or 
(2) the court makes written fIndings ... establishing that termination of 
the award would work a substantial injustice because of facts not present 
in most cases .... 
Awards under Topic 3 of the PRINCIPLES, which are based on reimbursement or rescission 
and relate to only a few marriages, do not terminate on remarriage. Id. § 5.14(3). 
107. Id. § 5.07 reporter's notes cmt. c. 
108. For a critique of the remarriage-termination rule generally, see Cynthia Lee 
Starnes, One More Time: Intuition, Alimony, and the Remarriage-Termination Rule, 81 
IND. L.J. 971 (2006). The legitimacy ofthe near-universal rule that alimony terminates 
automatically or presumptively upon a recipient's remarriage has a huge impact on ali-
mony recipients since approximately seventy-fIve percent of divorcing women remarry 
within ten years, and fIfty-four percent remarry within fIve years. DEP'TOFHEALTHAND 
HUMAN SERVS., COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE U.S., VITAL 
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in need of male support - any male will do. While the ALI thus 
strikes a powerful blow to the myth that mothering is free and offers 
a compelling solution to the real cost of mothering, its willingness 
to abandon mothers to a Cinderella future is disappointing. Even 
more disappointing is the ALI's reluctance to seriously challenge 
the myth that mothering is for babies. 
III. MOTHERING IS FOR BABIES109 
Now that I have them, they shan't escape me. 
- Wicked Witch in Hansel and GretelllO 
A. The Excessive Mother 
Fundamentally we know The Excessive Mother exists. Take, as 
her extreme example, the wicked witch in Hansel and Gretel, III who 
was an Excessive Cookie Baker indeed, having constructed an entire 
house of gingerbread, evidently for the very bad purpose of enticing 
and consuming children. Such Excessive Mothers are terrible, surely 
enough, but wicked witches are generally easy to spot.1l2 When, in 
the case of more ordinary mother figures, is enough really enough? 
When should a mother back off? 
AND HEALTH STATISTICS, Ser. 23, Num. 22, 22 (July 2002). Moreover, subsequent mar-
riages do not fully protect mothers from the effects of their depreciated human capital, 
since second marriages are at least as likely to fail as first ones. See BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, NUMBER, TIMING, AND 
DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996 3 (2002) (reporting that, based on 1996 
data, women who entered second marriages in 1975 through 1984 were less likely to 
reach their tenth anniversary than were women entering first marriages during the 
same period). 
109. While abrogation ofthe tender years doctrine (see generally Ex parte Devine, 398 
So. 2d 686 (A. 1981» dispels the notion that babies are for moms, the law has not yet 
abandoned the converse notion that moms are for babies. 
110. Wicked Witch, upon the approach of Hansel and Gretel. GRIMM'S FAIRY TALES 
BY THE BROTHERS GRIMM 330,337 (E.V. Lucas, Lucy Crane & Marian Edwardes trans., 
1945). As the story goes: 
Although the old woman appeared to be so friendly, she was really a wicked 
old witch who was on the watch for children, and she had built the bread 
house on purpose to lure them to her. Once her gingerbread house accom-
plished its purpose and lured Hansel and Gretel, the wicked witch continued 
her mothering: "Ah, dear children, who brought you here? Come in and stay 
with me. You shall come to no harm." She took them by the hand and led 
them into the little house. A nice dinner was set before them: pancakes and 
sugar, milk, apples, and nuts. Mter this she showed them two little white 
beds into which they crept, and they felt as if they were in heaven .... 
Id. at 337. 
111. Id. 
112. "Witches have red eyes and can't see very far, but they have keen noses like 
animals and can scent the approach of human beings." Id. 
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The initial question must be whether mothering beyond infancy 
confers a benefit at all. Surely, as mothering becomes less neces-
sary, it does not necessarily become valueless. As children outgrow 
the need for diapers, rational mothers do not persist in diapering 
them but direct their mothering efforts elsewhere - into planning 
and preparing family meals, 113 editing high school English papers, 
transporting children to ballet and swimming and soccer practice, rais-
ing money for football helmets, cleaning, laundering, tutoring, baking, 
shopping, and stocking underwear drawers. If a mother performed 
these labors for an employer no one would question whether the em-
ployer received a benefit. When she performs similar labors for her 
family, her actions also confer benefits, regardless of whether they 
are actually necessary. The point here is certainly not that mothers 
should do these things, but only that doing them confers a benefit. 114 
Of course, not all that is beneficial is valuable in the economic 
sense. The real concern may not be that post-infancy mothering con-
fers no benefit, but rather that it is inefficient. The question thus be-
comes: at what point on the continuum of a child's life do the costs of 
mothering exceed its benefits? When do the inefficiencies of work 
directed at an individual family (that does not actually need much 
mothering) warrant the conclusion that a mother should focus on 
the market instead, i.e., get a job or a job with more hours, and that 
her failure to do so must be a product of excessive mothering? Diffi-
cult questions follow: What are the costs (to a mother, to her family, 
to society) of mothering or of market engagement in lieu of mother-
ing? What are the benefits (to a mother, to her family, to society) of 
mothering or of market engagement in lieu of mothering? What are 
the costs and benefits (to a mother, to her family, to society) of a 
mother's ''balancing'' home and market labor in various ratios? Ob-
viously, some answers are easier to quantify than others. Consider 
the fictional case of Ms. Weber: 
It is a cold night in the middle of the winter of 1987. Sleet 
is falling in a thick film and the streets are deserted. Anthony 
and Julia walk down Twenty-second Street between First and 
113. See generally Marjorie L. DeVault, Doing Housework: Feeding and Family Life, 
in FAMILIES AND WORK 178 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987). 
114. One of the most significant teachings of feminism is the value of freedom to 
choose - to control one's own body, to hold property, to vote, to pursue an education, 
to work in the market. To the extent economic fortune allows, a woman should also be 
free to choose to work in her home. Of course, not all mothers who prioritize home-
making have made a voluntary choice to do so. Naomi Cahn has observed "constraints 
on women's lives such that they appear to choose a life of household duties and to 
conserve power within that sphere, when, in fact, the choice is rigged." Cahn, supra note 
33, at 180. 
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Second avenues and turn onto the tree-lined block called Gramercy 
Park East. Number 120, an old synagogue housing a small shelter 
for the homeless ... 
"I come herewith my wife," [Mr. Weber] says, nodding in the 
direction of a sm~ll, dark woman still engaged in preparing her 
belongings for the night. She takes a blue bathrobe from her shop-
ping bag, folds it in her lap, then pulls one out for her husband 
and lays it across the pillow, which she fluffs up before turning 
down the sheet. Carrying two white towels and a large plastic bag 
filled with soaps and creams, she walks out of the room as if she 
is alone and busy in her own home, as if there are not a dozen 
people seated at tables, many of them watching her intimate 
preparations for the night. ll5 
Ms. Weber's acts are small things: fluffing a husband's pillow, 
turning down his sheet, laying out his bathrobe. What are the costs 
and benefits of such actions? Not much cost evidently because Ms. 
Weber's efforts require only a few minutes. Unless, of course, she has 
arthritis or passed up work at McDonald's or McGraw Hill or Lehman 
Brothers to be there with her husband. As for benefits, Mr. Weber 
is hardly a baby; he is not even a child and certainly does not need 
anyone to fluff his pillow. Maybe he does not appreciate his wife's 
efforts much, having grown accustomed to them. If she had forgone 
her attentions this night, would costs have followed? Would Mr. Weber 
have been saddened by her absence or her inattentiveness? If there 
is not much benefit here, maybe there is still enough to outweigh the 
negligible cost. 
Market tools fail to capture that even small acts of mothering 
can confer great benefit. My Grandma would bring tea in a flowery 
china cup to soothe my tummy ache. If Grandma had been at work, 
she would not have been there to see my pain. Was she an excessive 
Grandma? As a teenager I may have thought so, but even then I was 
taking in something from her attentions: you are valuable, this is 
how you care for others - little lessons that build on one another 
and persist much longer than Grandma's cup oftea. Market analysis 
seems an awkward tool with which to value the efforts of mothers, 
Grandmas, and Ms. Webers. 
One thing seems clear, however, even without the help of market 
analysis. When Bobby boards the school bus for the first time, his 
mother's mandatory work load declines. But does Bobby's absence 
from 9:00 AM. to 2:00 P.M. necessarily mean his mother should take 
a job from 9:30 AM. to 1:30 P.M.? From 8:00 AM. to 5:00 P.M.? 
What if the physical and emotional stress of being on her feet all 
115. Jane Lazarre, Fictions of Home, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra 
note 9, at 47,50. 
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day or fighting office back-stabbing or appeasing angry clients makes 
Bobby's mother less efficient (and less caring) at home? How much 
time and energy does it take to mother well, to nurture a child, and 
to build a haven from the nastiness outside? Is a minimalist answer 
better than a generous one? Is there a one-size-fits-all answer? 
If we cannot answer such questions with confidence, maybe we 
would be wise to defer to a mother's judgment about how much 
mothering is appropriate. 116 Who can better understand what efforts 
will benefit her family and how much time those efforts require? A 
mother may be wrong in her assessment, but who has a better shot 
at being right? Not Bobby. And not third parties seduced by the 
myth that mothering is for babies. 
B. The Law of The Excessive Mother 
Too often the law, searching for The Excessive Mother, mistakes 
"unemployed" mothers of two-year-olds for wicked witches. The story 
begins with the normative vision of marriage as an egalitarian, com-
panionate relationship in which both spouses make equal contribu-
tions to the market and the home. From this foundation flows the 
natural conclusion that all mothers either are or should be at work 
in the market, with perhaps a limited exception for mothers of very 
young children. 
This understanding of the-way-things-are-supposed-to-be is 
dramatically evident in the laws governing imputation ofincome in 
child support cases. In all states, child support is calculated accord-
ing to guidelines which generate a presumptively appropriate amount 
of support based on various factors.1l7 When a residential parent's 
income is one of the guideline factors and that parent has limited 
her market employment in order to care for children, the law may 
impute income to her for purposes of calculating child support. 118 
This income imputation effectively reduces the amount of child sup-
port and thus creates an incentive for the unemployed or under-
employed residential parent to find appropriate employment. Of 
course, the effect of imputing income to a residential parent who 
does not respond by beginning or increasing her market work is 
simply to reduce the amount of support available to a child, a result 
that is starkly inconsistent with family law's general goal of protect-
ing the best interests of children.119 
116. One should continue to watch out, of course, for the truly terrible mother guilty 
of abuse or neglect. 
117. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 459-60. 
118. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.15 (l)(a). 
119. In most states, for example, custody is determined according to the best interest 
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So when do a child's needs allow a residential parent's increased 
employment and thus justify income imputation to a mother who is 
inappropriately underemployed? Early on, say some states. Defer-
ence to a caretaker's employment decision is appropriate, says Idaho, 
only until a child is six months old. 120 Two years old, say Alaska 121 
and Maryland. 122 Two and a half years old, says Colorado. 123 Three 
years old, say Kentucky,124 Maine,125 and North Carolina. 126 Five years 
old, says Louisiana.127 Six years old, say Massachusetts128 and New 
Mexico. 129 
Once a child reaches this identified age, income may be imputed 
to "enable" the gainful employment of a mother who has misjudged 
of the child. See, e.g., UMDA, supra note 11, § 402 (''The court shall determine custody 
in accordance with the best interest of the child."). See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, 
at 564-65. 
120. IDAHO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, § 6(c)(1), in IDAHO R. CIV. P. 6(c)(6) (2006) 
("Ordinarily, a parent shall not be deemed underemployed if the parent is caring for a 
child not more than 6 months of age."). 
121. ALAsKAR. CIV. 90.3(a)(4) (2006) ("A determination of potential income may not 
be made for a parent who is physically or mentally incapacitated, or who is caring for 
a child under two years of age to whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility."). 
122. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2004) ("A determination 
of potential income may not be made for a parent who ... is caring for a child under the 
age of 2 years for whom the parents are jointly and severally responsible."). 
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(b)(1) (2004) 
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support shall 
be calculated based on a determination of potential income; except that a 
determination of potential income shall not be made for a parent who is 
physically or mentally incapacitated or is caring for a child under the age of 
thirty months for whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility. 
124. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(d) (LexisNexis 1999) (noting that "a determi-
nation of potential income shall not be made for a parent who is physically or mentally 
incapacitated or is caring for a very young child, age three (3) or younger, for whom the 
parents owe a joint legal responsibility"). 
125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. i9-A, § 2001(5)(D) (1998) ("In the absence of evidence 
in the record to the contrary, a party that is personally providing primary care for a 
child under the age of 3 years is deemed not available for employment."). 
126. N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, Income (3), AOC-A·162, Rev. 10102 at 3 (2002). 
127. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.11 (A) (2000) ("If a party is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of his or 
her income earning potential, unless the party is physically or mentally incapacitated, 
or is caring for a child of the parties under the age of five years."). 
128. MAss. PROB. & FAM. CT. R., Child Support Guidelines, Guideline II (1996) 
If the court makes a determination that either or both parties is earning 
substantially less than he or she could through reasonable effort, the court 
may consider potential earning capacity rather than actual earnings .... 
This determination is not intended to apply to a custodial parent with 
children who are under the age of six living in the home. 
129. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11.1(C)(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (statingthat'"income' means 
actual gross income of a parent if employed to full capacity or potential income if 
unemployed or underemployed. Income need not be imputed to the primary custodial 
parent actively caring for a child of the parties who is under the age of six or disabled"). 
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how much mothering is appropriate. Of course not every court will 
not impute income to every mother of a child beyond the threshold 
age. 130 Still, the law's message is disturbingly clear: after a child 
reaches the age of six months, six years, or some age in between, a 
judge should assess whether a mother's decision to limit her market 
investment in order to mother is warranted in view of her market 
opportunities. At worst, a judge begins this costlbenefit appraisal 
of a mother's decision with the assumption that if a mother can earn 
more, she should earn more, since the law has already disqualified 
her from the statutory deference granted mothers of younger children. 
The danger to mothers posed by the myth that mothering-is-
for-babies is not limited to child support. The same reasoning that 
leads a court to reduce child support in order to coax a mother out of 
the home may lead a court to deny or limit alimony toward the same 
end.131 Consider the case of the long-term, full-time homemaker who 
has been out of the job market for many years. If mothers should be 
working in the paid economy once a child reaches age six months or 
six years, how can this homemaker justify the time she spent in full-
time mothering beyond her children's early years? Surely, she must 
be an Excessive Mother. Superfluous. Lazy. Self-Indulgent. For some 
reason, she has behaved inefficiently, inappropriately, and there-
fore, any market costs that flow from such behavior are her fault 
and her responsibility. No long-term alimony for such an Excessive 
Mother, who needs a kick in the pants to get her off the sofa and into 
real, meaningful labor. 
Similar reasoning endangers the younger mother who has com-
promised her market investment to care for children, either by tem-
porarily dropping out of the market, or by working part-time or 
seasonally, perhaps in the secondary-job market in order to accom-
modate her caretaking. Unlike the long-term Betty Crocker, this 
mother's most potentially productive career years may lie ahead of 
her. Ample time for a judge to set her on the path to productive citizen-
ship by encouraging her to become gainfully employed, i.e., by deny-
ing her alimony, or awarding her just enough to allow her education 
or retraining. Clearly, an alimony award sufficient to enable her to 
persist in excessive mothering would be very bad. The law of alimony, 
like the law of child support, thus invites judges to determine how 
130. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.15 (5) (in exercising its discretion to 
impute income to a residential parent whose child is age six or older, "the court should 
additionally consider the benefit, if any, accruing to the children of the parties from the 
residential parent's underemployment"). 
131. For a discussion of the key role of judicial discretion in alimony decision making, 
see UMDA, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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much mothering is "appropriate" or "excessive" - a frightening pros-
pect for a mother facing a judge who thinks mothering is for babies. 
C. The ALI Response 
The ALI's response to the myth of The Excessive Mother begins 
with identification of the norm of universal adult ''labor-force partici-
pation.,,132 While acknowledging the constraints childcare places on 
a caretaker's ability to pursue paid employment, the ALI is clear that 
"child support rules [should] not discourage the residential parent's 
labor-force participation."133 As the ALI explains: 
During a child's minority, the interests of all parties 
are generally best served by enabling the gainful employ-
ment of the residential parent to the extent consistent 
with the needs of the child. When the child has grown 
up, it is in the residential parent's interest to have 
maximized the quality and quantity of past labor-force 
participation. 134 
Imputation of income to a residential parent may be appropriate, 
says the ALI, when "the residential parent is not caring for a child 
of the parties under the age of six .. . ."135 Too bad for caretakers 
whose understanding of appropriate mothering conflicts with the 
myth that mothering is for babies. 
132. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.03 cmt. d. 
133. Id. § 3.04, cmt. e. 
134. Id. § 3.04, cmt. e. The ALI makes clear that its reference to the "needs of the 
child" rather than a more generous standard such as the ''best interests of the child," 
or other standard focusing on benefit, was no accident. Id. While a child may benefit 
from parental attention, admit the drafters, fairness to the other parent may never-
theless requires a caretaker's "gainful employment." Id. Fairness to adults thus trumps 
the best interests of the child. For a commentary on the ALI's child support scheme, see 
Leslie Joan Harris, The ALI Child Support Principles: Incremental Changes to Improve 
the Lot of Children and Residential Parents, 8 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'y 245, 252 (2001). 
135. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3. 15(1)(a) (emphasis added). This section continues: 
"and is earning less than the parent could reasonably earn considering the parent's 
residential responsibility for the children of the parties .... " Id. 
An Appendix to the child support chapter of the Principles contains an alternative 
formula with a supplementary award for low-income residential parents. Under § 3.052A, 
a presumption arises that limitation of market employment in order to care for children 
is appropriate when: "(a) the child is below the age of three; (b) three or more children 
are below the age of 10; (c) the child is disabled; (d) the cost of child care required by the 
residential parent's employment would exceed resultant earnings." Id. § 3.052 (A)(2). 
This presumption "may be overcome by proof that limitation of market labor is inappro-
priate or excessive in terms of the children's needs." Id. § 3.052A(3) (emphasis added). 
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IV. WHAT Now - A PARTNERSHIP POSTSCRIPT 
"He has nothing on at all," cried at last the whole 
people. That made a deep impression on the em-
peror, for it seemed to him that they were right; 
but he thought to himself, 'Now I must bear up to 
the end. ' And the chamberlains walked with still 
greater dignity, as if they carried the train which 
did not exist. 
231 
- The Emperor's New Clothes136 
It is time to put aside mother myths. Mothering does not just 
happen; mothers are performing countless tasks in the daily work 
of child rearing and homemaking. Mothering is not free; mothers com-
monly pay a hefty market price for their home efforts. Mothering is 
not just for babies; mothers serve a valuable social function that im-
proves the quality oflife, far beyond the diaper and pre-school years. 
Debunking mother myths is not enough. It is also time to shed the 
peculiar egalitarian model of marriage these myths support, a model 
that falsely portrays real marriages and that confuses equality of 
status with identity of contribution. 
Help in fashioning a better model of marriage comes, again, from 
partnership. Elsewhere I have argued that: partnership is an intui-
tive metaphor for marriage; 137 the language and principles of partner -
ship help shed gender-determinative marital roles;138 partnership 
offers a positive model for post-divorce income sharing that casts 
mothers as equal stakeholders in marriage rather than pitiable casu-
alties of marriage; 139 an analogy to partnership buyouts provides a 
useful mathematical model for alimony; 140 and an analogy to unfin-
ished partnership business supports a parenting-partnership model 
for income-sharing during the minority of minor children.141 Many 
partnerships, for example, involve a specialization of labor in which 
one partner contributes capital primarily or exclusively, while another 
136. MICHAELH.AauE'sFAVOURITEHANSCHRISTIANANDERSENFAIRYTALES441(Li1y 
Owens ed., 1981}. 
137. Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 119-24. 
138. Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53, at 1534-35. 
139. [d. at 1527-38 (comparing a partnership model to the ALI's loss-sharing model). 
140. Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 124-38. 
141. Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53, at 1544-52. 
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contributes services primarily or exclusively.142 Notwithstanding 
the partners' different contributions, partnership default rules pro-
vide that "all partners have equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the partnership business,"143 and profits and losses are 
divided equally.144 In practice, this default rule means that what-
ever the contribution of the individual partners, in the absence of 
an agreement otherwise, they are equal in status and equally entitled 
to any income either partner generates.145 
Like business partnerships, many marriages involve a special-
ization of labor in which one spouse primarily contributes capital 
and the other services. In a quasi-traditional marriage, for example, 
one spouse primarily contributes income through outside employ-
ment and the other primarily contributes household services, including 
child care. No matter whether marital roles are traditional, quasi-
traditional, or truly egalitarian (both spouses assume full-time paid 
employment and fifty percent of household chores), the default rule 
should be that spousal partners are equal in status and equally en-
titled and obliged to share in the financial gains and losses produced 
by the marriage. 
If, as Bradford Wilcox and Steven Nock report,146 women are 
happiest in marriages with traditional divisions oflabor, it is not be-
cause they have shed egalitarian attitudes, but because they do not 
associate unequal contributions to home labor with inferior status.147 
Perhaps these women understand something the law does not-
that equality of status is not a function of equality of contribution, 
that even mothers who launder underwear can be equal partners in 
marriage. 
142. See ROBERTW.HAMILTON, FuNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 13.3.4 (1989). 
143. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18( e)(200 1) [hereinafter UP AJ; see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP 
ACT § 401(f). See generally DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs 
§ 8.3 (2002). 
144. UPA § 18(a). 
145. Alicia Brokars Kelly has drawn an inlportant connection between such a partner-
ship scheme and community property regimes. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating 
Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of 
a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 173 (2004). This scheme is also consistent with 
Joan Williams's concept of a "falnily wage," although she does not endorse a partnership 
metaphor for marriage. See WILLIAMS, supra note 73. 
146. See Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2. 
147. See id. at 1328, 1331 (finding support for the hypothesis that "[ t J raditional wives 
have lower expectations of marital equality in the division of household labor and emo-
tional work; consequently they will be happier with their marriages, and the marital 
emotion work they receive, because they do not associate equity with equality") (em-
phasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
Family law's model of marriage as a companionate, egalitarian 
relationship in which spouses make equal or similar contributions 
to work and home does not reflect the reality of many marriages. 
The attractiveness of this simplistic model of equality lies partly in 
three supporting mother myths: mothering just happens, mothering 
is free, and mothering is for babies. Innocent as they may seem, these 
myths pose great danger for divorcing mothers by creating fictional 
baselines of appropriate behavior against which real mothers are 
judged. While the ALI has taken steps toward slaying portions of these 
myths, their ultimate demise depends on abandonment of the law's 
egalitarian model of marriage and adoption of a model that distin-
guishes between status and contribution. Such a model lies in the 
gender-neutral, equality-based principles and rules of partnership. 
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